An early-year election with high stakes
Most of Nepal’s past national elections have been held in November, when weather conditions are relatively stable and mountain passes are open. The decision to hold the House of Representatives and Provincial Assembly elections on March 5 compresses the preparation window into the winter months, increasing the operational difficulty but also reflecting an urgent political timetable after last year’s youth-led protests and the subsequent dissolution of parliament.
Election officials insist that ‘there is no alternative’ to the announced date, arguing that postponement would deepen uncertainty and risk further eroding public trust. The question, however, is whether state institutions have adapted quickly enough to the realities of winter voting.
Logistics: materials are moving, but margins are thin
On paper, the Election Commission appears to be ahead of its own calendar. Fourteen categories of centrally procured materials – from ballot papers and ballot boxes to seals, ink and forms – have been dispatched to districts. District and provincial offices have procured 37 types of local materials, which are being repackaged and stored closer to polling centres.
This two-tier supply chain is designed to create redundancy: if one warehouse is cut off by snow or landslides, nearby depots can step in. Yet the margins are thin. In several high-altitude constituencies, roads can be blocked for days at a time in late February and early March.
The Commission is therefore planning to rely on helicopters and special vehicles to complete last-mile distribution, particularly in mountain districts. This is not unprecedented – aerial support was used in previous elections – but the risk profile is higher when the entire country votes during the cold season rather than just a subset of constituencies.
Weather risk: localised disruption versus national delay
The biggest concern is not that the entire election will be derailed by weather, but that a small number of polling stations could become inaccessible on or just before March 5.
If a few stations are unable to open on time, the law allows for repolling in those locations. The real challenge would be political: parties that lose narrowly may question results if they believe adverse weather selectively affected their strongholds.
To reduce this risk, election managers and local administrations must communicate early and transparently about contingency plans. That includes clearly informing parties and voters when airlifts will be used, how ballot-box security will be ensured, and under what conditions polling may be postponed at specific centres.
Security: an ambitious multi-layer plan
On the security front, the government has endorsed an integrated plan that will mobilise more than 300,000 personnel from Nepal Police, Armed Police Force, the Nepali Army, the National Investigation Department and temporary election police.
The architecture is multi-layered. Nepal Police and temporary ‘election police’ form the inner ring directly around polling centres, responsible for crowd control, order and first response. The Armed Police Force constitutes the second ring in sensitive areas, providing reinforcement and crowd-management capability. The Nepali Army acts as the third ring, protecting strategic sites and offering logistical support.
In early February, the army began leaving barracks to establish base camps across the country, while nearly 150,000 election police recruits received appointment letters and started intensive training. Joint drills and simulations are underway, especially in districts with a history of electoral violence or where new risk factors – such as social media-driven mobilisation – have emerged.
‘Highly sensitive’ polling stations and trust
Compared to 2022, security agencies have classified a significantly larger number of polling stations as ‘highly sensitive’, based on past clashes, criminal activity, demographic tensions and remoteness.
These centres will see thicker deployment at every ring and tighter control over ballot-box movement, including the use of convoys and escorts. While such measures may be necessary, they also raise concerns about the perception of militarisation of polling places, especially in communities that have experienced heavy-handed policing in the past.
Maintaining trust will depend on how security forces conduct themselves on the ground: whether they facilitate peaceful voting without intimidation, respect the authority of presiding officers and the Election Commission, and treat all parties equally.
Institutional coordination: where the risks lie
The blueprint for March 5 looks robust on paper. The real vulnerabilities lie in coordination – between central and local administrations, civil and military chains of command, and election officials and security planners.
Past elections have shown that confusion over who can order what, and when, during a tense incident can be more damaging than a shortage of personnel. Clear standard operating procedures, joint control rooms and real-time communication channels will be essential.
Another risk is uneven capacity across districts. Some election offices are well staffed and experienced; others face shortages of trained personnel and equipment. Without targeted support, weaker districts may become bottlenecks in logistics, security or dispute resolution.
What voters should watch for
For citizens, the key indicators in the coming weeks will be straightforward:
- Whether voter education reaches remote and marginalised communities in time, including clear explanations of the four-ballot system.
- Whether local authorities communicate openly about security arrangements, especially in areas labelled ‘highly sensitive’.
- How quickly and transparently the Election Commission responds to complaints of code of conduct violations or misuse of state resources.
If these elements function well, Nepal can demonstrate that it is capable of conducting a complex national election in early March without compromising credibility.
If they falter, the early-year timing could become another point of contention in an already fragile political environment.
The next three weeks will reveal whether institutions can match the urgency that the political calendar – and the public mood after the Gen Z uprising – has imposed.