The 2026 House of Representatives election is being held under the same broad electoral design that Nepal adopted after the 2015 Constitution: a mixed system in which 165 lawmakers are chosen from single-member constituencies by first-past-the-post (FPTP) and 110 are selected from nationwide proportional representation (PR) party lists. On paper, this architecture balances direct local accountability with inclusive representation. In practice, it also creates complex incentives that shape how parties choose candidates, craft alliances and communicate with voters.
At the constituency level, FPTP races tend to favour larger, better-organised parties and alliances, because a small edge in votes can translate into a full seat. This is why traditional forces like the Nepali Congress, CPN-UML and Maoist Centre still invest heavily in local networks and negotiated seat-sharing. For newer and smaller forces, FPTP is high risk but high reward: a breakthrough win can deliver visible leadership and bargaining power in coalition talks, but scattered votes across many constituencies can easily turn into zero seats. As a result, some alternative parties are targeting a limited number of winnable constituencies rather than spreading themselves too thin.
The PR tier plays a different but equally important role. It allows parties that cross the national threshold to convert broad but shallow support into seats, giving voice to regions and identities that might not win in head-to-head constituency fights. Advocates for inclusion emphasise that PR lists are where legal commitments to representation of women, Dalits, Madhesi, Tharu, Janajati and other communities must be honoured in practice, not just in slogans. In the 2026 race, civil society scrutiny of PR lists is particularly intense, as youth groups demand both diversity and meaningful placement of marginalised candidates near the top of closed lists.
For the Election Commission, the mixed model raises operational and regulatory challenges. Designing and printing four different ballot papers, training polling staff to handle parallel counts, and explaining the system to voters require substantial planning. The Commission must also monitor how parties describe the system: false claims that voters have only one combined ballot, or that small parties are barred from PR lists, not only mislead citizens but can distort tactical voting. Transparent communication on how FPTP and PR seats are tallied and combined is central to maintaining trust in the final results.
Politically, the interaction between FPTP and PR tends to moderate extremes. A party that performs strongly in FPTP but poorly in PR, or vice versa, may still end up short of a majority, forcing coalition-building. This is already visible in pre-election alliance talks, in which parties trade off safe FPTP constituencies in exchange for cooperation on PR messaging or post-poll cabinet arrangements. New alliances such as the youth-oriented front around Rastriya Swatantra Party and Kathmandu mayor Balendra Shah hope that their urban momentum will deliver both constituency wins and a solid PR share, while established parties are betting that their rural networks will hold.
For voters, the mixed system offers both opportunities and responsibilities. It enables split-ticket voting: choosing one candidate in the constituency race and a different party in the PR ballot, to reward local performance while supporting a different national agenda. But it also demands more information and attention than a single-ballot system. In the run-up to March 5, the quality of voter education on how the two tiers function together will directly influence not only turnout but also how representative and legitimate the next House of Representatives is perceived to be.